Oh yes - the Defence Review

It really is very inconsiderate of HMG to make announcements about things I'm interested in when I'm off on hols. The Strategic Defence & Security Review (SDSR) is clearly a big deal, and one with potentially large implications for the future.

My first reaction was one of relief - there is considerable pain in there, but things could have been much, much, worse. Liam "Dr Foxy" deserves a lot of credit for softening the blow, and if things pan out he may end up being seen as a truly great Defence Secretary - taking some calculated risks and capability gaps because the finances make them unavoidable, but retaining the ability to regenerate capabilities if and when needed and the money allows. But there's a lot of uncertainty.

I actually found a better summary than anything I could write here.

This is from someone whom I have "known" over the net for a few years - both MOD and RNR:

"I’ve been travelling back to HERRICK from R&R over the past few days, so managed to miss the SDSR announcements and initial reactions. However, one comment from a mate of mine at KAF seemed to perhaps sum up a point of view not widely appreciated – when asked how it had gone, his reaction was ‘dig beneath the surface reactions, and it’s not as bad as it seemed, or could have been’.

I think this is an interesting take, so wanted to try and put into words my thinking about how despite the desperate hyperbole out there (yes, I’m looking at you pro CVF brigade!), the actual result isn’t actually as bad as its made out to be.

From my perspective the SDSR seems to be tackling the problem of a huge overspend, dire economic position and much needed update on the UKS strategic direction in one go. This is never a good starting point for a review, as its never clear how much of the end result is actually ‘strategic’ and not ‘budget’ driven. That said, the National Security Strategy (NSS) makes a pretty good stab at setting out the threats that we face, and putting the UKs key weakness areas on display. Any discussion of the end result of SDSR force levels has to be set against the realities of the NSS issues – decrying the UK for losing its sovereign ability to kick the door in, is pointless if the NSS quite rightly recognises that we’re not really doing that anymore.

My assessment then is that if you look at the force levels and the decisions taken to remove elements from service in 2 contexts, some of it isn’t actually that bad. Firstly, lets consider force structures against NSS mandated threats to the UK. Secondly, lets consider the force structure of 2020 as being the point at which the UK is able to operate again – we’re clear that HERRICK ends in 2014/15, and its equally clear that the recuperation, force regeneration and retraining to ‘peacetime’ capability is going to take 4-5 years. In other words, when we talk of a 10 year plan, it makes a lot of sense – HM Forces will not have the physical ability to do much beyond HERRICK anyway until 2015, and then we will be so broken, and the political appetite for intervention will be so weak, that its unlikely that we’ll see any significant ‘imperial adventures’ until this point at the earliest. So in those circumstances, the ‘big 4’ threats (namely Terrorism, Disasters, Cyber, Alliance Warfare) make a compelling argument for future priorities.

One thing that I was most struck by was the lack of emphasis on our wider multi-lateral commitments outside of ISAF. I didn’t spot a single reference to the FPDA for instance. It is clear that the ‘East of Suez’ Mentality which has permeated thinking for years is being de-emphasised in favour of a more ‘hands off’ approach. It will be interesting to see how this sits with our allies in the far east.

Labour would have done the same - This is a key point we need to get about the SDSR. None of the options on display seemed new or innovative. I have no doubt at all that had a labour government done this SDSR, then we’d have seen almost identical results – for all the talk of it being a strategic review, it doesn’t seem to have generated any new or exciting options for the MOD.

CVS & The Escort Fleet
The most significant arguments seem to revolve around the RN and its decision to go to 19 escorts and lose a carrier. To my mind, this hyperbole is somewhat overblown - the RN has always been clear that we would lose the 3 Invincibles in 10,12,15 respectively, and the GR9 OSD was always aligned to coincide with that. Even if the decision not to lose GR9 had been taken, we’d have faced a ‘carrier gap’ in 2014 anyway as the Royal approached OSD. This decision is merely bringing forward the same gap as before.
What impact does losing GR9 actually have on the RN – well its hard to tell. On the one hand there is the natural loss of pride that comes from losing fixed wing aviation. However, as a hard headed realist would note, the RN has been out of the fixed wing carrier business since FA2 went OSD. Since that point we’ve only seen occasional deployments by CVS with a GR9 airwing embarked, usually a maximum of 6 aircraft. In other words, since 2004, the RN has been unable to deploy more than 6 planes to sea anyway, and to all intents and purposes was a non fixed wing deploying nation anyway from 2006 – 2009 when the GR9 was in HERRICK. In other words, we’ve not actually really had a carrier fixed wing capability now for nearly half a decade – we’ve done the odd short deployment, but to all intents and purposes, the RN has been out of the fixed wing game for some time now.

So, while some of the posters here bemoan the loss of CVS as some kind of mortal death blow to the RN, I’m far more sanguine about it. Ultimately GR9 provided us with the ability to put a tiny number of airframes to sea, which when set against the context that the UK isn’t planning on using carrier borne airpower for strike purposes anyway for the next 10 years, makes little sense to retain the GR9 capability beyond seedcorn capability for the CVF.

Now when we talk about regeneration of skills, this is where I do worry – its going to be several years before the RN gets to do fixed wing flying again, and in this time many pilots will leave. I really hope that a clever plan is in place to ensure that we get retain the skills required for CVF, otherwise we’re going to look pretty bloody stupid having a carrier with no planes. This is my big worry – I cant think of a single navy that has ever successfully regenerated carrier capability after such a long gap, so I’d like to know how the RN is going to manage it.

As for the escort fleet, well to be honest I’m fairly relaxed about the cut to 19 hulls. To all intents and purposes the RN has been operating with 19 hulls for years – dig beneath the fleet stats and you’ll see that the residual 42s are barely floating and not deployable. To all intents, the RN has managed to meet its commitments with a lot less than 23 hulls for some time now.

The SDSR seems to make clear that we’ll continue doing the 3 traditional tasks (UK home waters, West Indies and South Atlantic) and then do East of Suez and Piracy as available. To my reckoning a fleet of 19 escorts will give us about 15 available and in the programming cycle at any one time – so 4 deployed, 1 in home waters as FRE, and then 10 spare for work up / work down / surge capacity. Its tight, but not much more so than recent years.

Amphibiosity - The cuts to the Amphib fleet look bad on the face of it, with the loss of an LPD and LSD(A). However, having dug about a bit, it seems we’re looking to retain the ability to dump roughly 2000 troops on hostile soil and recover them. This is a reduction in previous planning assumptions, but one that does make quite a bit of sense – we’ve not had the ability to do a proper amphibious assault for some years now – the RM commitment to HERRICK means our amphib forces have only really worked at roughly 2000 boots ashore now for a few years. Additionally looking back to the strategic context, 2000 troops is a figure commensurate with the much vaunted ‘SSFI’ (Small Scale Focused Intervention) capability, enabling us to put people ashore for a short raid, or recovery of UK persons. Given that we’ve said we’re not seeking to carry out a wider operation till at least 2020, and given that sticking 4-6000 troops ashore (which seems roughly previous levels) is not so much a raid, but a statement of intent to take out a lease on the local property market, then the reduction to the amphib fleet makes strategic sense.

SSN Fleet - Delighted to see that there is a commitment to 7 Astutes – this seems to make sense now that Trident is delayed as it will provide a drumbeat capability for the Barrow yard. My key concern though is what force levels do in the build up to 7 hulls – will we see a dip to 6, or even 5, in the next few years as the older T boats pay off? My concern is that although we aspire to 7, we may end up with a significantly smaller SSN fleet for a prolonged period.

The Strange Death of the Fleet Air Arm - To my mind, one of the most disturbing aspects of the SDSR process has been the way in which the FAA has lost both the fixed wing and commando helicopter force. One of the little noticed paragraphs is that the SK fleet will pay off in 2016, but there appears to be mass confusion over the Merlin. At present it looks like the Merlin Mk 3 will not be transferring from the RAF to the RN, and that the RAF has become the new provider of the CHF. At a stroke the RN has lost its littoral capability, and a 10 year capability gap on the fixed wing community. At the moment its looking increasingly difficult for the RN to justify the continued existence of the FAA – no FW pilots, no CHF assets, merely 30 odd Merlin and 30 odd Lynx. How much longer till the RAF moves to absorb the FAA into its ORBAT?

No news on MARS - One of my main concerns is the complete blackout with regards to the MARS tanker project. This is essential to the future of the RN if we are to remain a blue water navy. We need 5-6 tankers soon as our current ones are rapidly running out of life, so the lack of news on them is a major concern. The RFA is in a dire state for its tankers and replenishment ships, yet all funds seem to have been diverted to feed the hungry behemoth that is CVF – I think this is a major mistake.

MPA Woes - The decision that I am most concerned about is without doubt the removal of the Nimrod from service. While I can see the logic in not proceeding (9 airframes = 3 deployable ones), and accept that the project was doomed from the moment we dropped below 10 airframes, it is still madness that we will be running an SSBN operation without fast on call ASW capability. This is going to place a much heavier burden on the extant ASW forces – could we see a new Merlin det up in Prestwick again to help with the ‘delousing’ process in future?

My expectation is that we’ll see UK coastguard eventually acquire some form of cheap MPA, but that the UK has taken a major capability hit in this area. Of all the decisions in the SDSR, this is the one I disagree with the most. "

But as for the wisdom of the Nimrod cancellation, here's something from someone on the same thread who is a British-born, but now American defence analyst and consultant:

"There's two terrifying words that sum up the problem. Systems integration. That and the fact that every airframe is different and things that fit in one don't in others. There's a lot of other things as well but everybody is keeping very quiet about them. The upshoot of it all is though that Nimrod MRA.4 is about as much an LRMPA as Noddy's tricycle. "

And that is just about that.

[For those who don't know already, here's a potted account of why the Nimrod MRA.4 project has been such a disaster.

Back in the early 1990s, it was decided (correctly) that the existing force of Nimrod MR.2s needed upgrading or replacing. Various options were considered, including buying new US-built replacements or even entirely new-built Nimrods. But the option chosen was an almost total rebuild of the existing aircraft - they would be given new wings, engines, tailplane, fuselage pressure floor, and internal kit. The only original item left would be the fuselage pressure tube itself.

BAE got going with the prototype. The laser micrometers and computers got to work recording the dimensions of the original parts. The replacements were made using CAD/CAM machines to the same specs. They fitted perfectly.

BAE turned to the second airframe. They churned out a second set of new components to the same spec as the first. They were brought together with the second airframe.

Klunk, crunch, screech.

Nothing fitted.

The horrible truth dawned - the original Nimrod airframes had been built in the 60s - a time when "precision manufacturing" meant "build it roughly to spec and then use a hammer to get everything to fit".

On top of which, 30+ years of maintenance and customisation by RAF lineys meant each aircraft had a unique set of drill-holes, conduits and so on.

So, inevitably, the original idea of 21 generic rebuilds fell to 12 customised ones, and then 9, and then cancellation.

Some may be tempted to laugh at this as a uniquely UK problem. It isn't.

Look up the disasters the French have had with their carrier Charles de Gaulle and the Rafale aircraft, or the American procurement catastrophes with the A-12, LCS and Zumwalt-class destroyers.]